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THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL JURY*
REGINA SCHULLER** AND NEIL VIDMAR***
INTRODUCTION
The Canadian jury is derived from English common law, and in many
respects Canadian judges still look to English law as a primary standard
when making decisions on matters relevant to the jury. Nevertheless, the
Canadian jury system has some strikingly unique characteristics regarding
potential juror prejudice that distinguish it from the contemporary English
jury system and the jury systems of other common law countries, particu-
larly that of the United States. In recent years, however, Canadian courts
have struggled with issues of racial and ethnic prejudice, pretrial publicity,
jury trials deemed too lengthy, and new forms of scientific evidence. Addi-
tionally, Canadian jury law has had to modify jury procedures for trials
involving aboriginal peoples in its arctic regions.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN JURY SYSTEM
English common law, including the right to trial by jury, was followed
almost from the beginning of the development of the separate English co-
lonies that eventually became the nation of Canada. For example, Nova
Scotia recognized the right to jury trial in the 1750's, after the English pop-
ulation began to exceed the original Acadian (French speaking) popula-
tion.1 Jury trials were used in the inferior Courts of Common Pleas as well
as in the Supreme Courts (superior courts) for civil as well as criminal mat-
ters.2 A General Sessions Court also used juries, and additionally there
were coroner's juries and grand juries, the latter working with magistrates
* This article is a substantially revised and up-dated version of a chapter by Neil Vidmar, The
Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, that appeared in Vidmar, N. (Ed.) WORLD
JURY SYSTEMS, Oxford England: Oxford University Press (2000). The authors are indebted to The
Honourable John Vertes, Senior Judge of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories for comments
on an earlier draft of this article.
** Professor of Psychology , York University , Canada
*** Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law, Duke Law School and Professor of Psychology
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to help administer local government. 3 However, jury duties were reserved
only for propertied men, and considered onerous-in some instances, jury
duty required travel from distant areas, lodging at the juror's expense and
trial duties that might last many weeks.4 By about 1880, the original jury
systems were in sharp decline and primarily reserved for serious criminal
offenses.5 Similar use and gradual decline of the jury occurred in Upper
Canada (most of which became the Province of Ontario). 6 Following the
defeat of the French army outside Quebec City, the law of England was
established in the colony of Quebec in 1763.7 Although French civil law
was restored in Quebec in 1774, English criminal law remained in force.8
Under the British North America Act, which established the Dominion
of Canada in 1867, Parliament passed the Criminal Code recognizing the
right to jury trial for serious criminal offenses. When the Constitution Act,
known as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter"), was
passed in 1982 it specifically recognized the right to jury trial: "Any person
charged with an offence has the right. . . except in the case of an offence
under military law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by
jury where the maximum penalty for the offence is imprisonment for five
years or a more severe punishment ... .9
Although civil juries were once used with some regularity across Can-
ada, today they are seldom used outside the provinces of Ontario and Brit-
ish Columbia.10
Prevailing law allows judges to decide whether the matters are too
complex for a jury; and in common practice and in the other English speak-
ing provinces, they are seldom used except for rare cases involving libel or
similar matters.11 Civil law, which does not provide for juries in civil mat-
ters, prevails in Quebec.12 In Ontario and British Columbia civil jury trials
3. Id
4. Id. at 20--31.
5. Id. at 14.
6. Id. at 214.
7. Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, WORLD JURY
Sys. 211, 217 (Neil Vidmar, ed., 2000).
8. Id.
9. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sche-
dule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 1 1(f) (U.K.).
10. See W.A. Bogart, "Guardian of Civil Rights ... Medieval Relic ": The Civil Jury in Canada,
in WORLD JURY Sys. 405, 407 (Neil Vidmar, ed., 2000).
11. Id. at 407-09. The Federal Court of Canada also does not provide for jury trial.
12. Id. at 407.
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do occur, including trials for medical malpractice, but not at nearly the
rates that they occur in the United States.13
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Although the right to jury trial is enshrined in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, that right needs to be understood in the context of the
Criminal Code.14 When Parliament passed the uniform Criminal Code of
1892, it followed Sir James Fitzjames Steven's draft English code of
1880.15 The basic structure of that draft is retained in the modem Criminal
Code.16 The Code divides offenses into three types.17 Indictable offenses
include the most serious crimes, such as murder and treason, which must be
tried in a superior court before a judge and jury.18 Summary conviction
offenses are less serious offenses, such as driving while disqualified, keep-
ing a common bawdy house, and theft or fraud under $5,000.19 Summary
offenses are tried by judge alone in a lower court, and there is no right to
jury trial.20The third category involves hybrid offenses (often called "either
way offenses") that can be tried either as an indictable crime or as a sum-
mary conviction offense.21 Offenses falling under this category include
assaults of all kinds, serious fraud, conspiracy, being an accessory to a
crime, and drug offenses.22 The decision to proceed by indictment is solely
determined by the prosecuting Crown Attorney and, with a few exceptions,
is not subject to judicial review.23 However, once the Crown has elected to
proceed by indictment, for most of these offenses the accused person has
the right to decide whether to be tried by judge and jury or by judge
alone.24
Canada has two official languages, English and French. Section 530 of
the Code provides that an accused has the right to be tried by a judge and
13. Id. at 405, 409; ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE USE OF
JURY TRIALS IN CIVIL CASES 14 (1994) (British Columbia).
14. Canadian Charter, supra note 9; Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
15. See DESMOND H. BROWN, THE GENESIS OF THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODEOF 1892 121-26
(1989).
16. CHRISTOPHER GRANGER, THE CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL IN CANADA 37 (2d ed. 1996).
17. See id at 37-54.
18. Id. at 37, 39-40.
19. Id. at 42.
20. Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 38.
22. See id.at 39-42.
23. Id. at 38.
24. Id. at 42. However, a few offenses are not eligible for jury trial. SeeCanada Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 553.
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jury who speak the language of the accused, or, if special circumstances
warrant it, a judge and jury composed of persons who speak both languag-
es.25 Section 531 provides that a change of venue to a different territory
within a province may be made in order to obtain a jury with the required
language skills. 26 Additionally, as will be discussed in more detail below,
exceptions are made for aboriginal peoples in Canada's arctic regions.27
It is difficult to obtain nationwide statistics on the absolute number of
criminal jury trials or what percentage of accused persons elect for jury
trial when they have that option. 28 However, in 1994 in Ontario, the largest
province with a population of eleven million persons (approximately one-
third of Canada's entire population), there were 1,018 criminal jury trials in
the general Division Court, a superior court. 29 In contrast, there were 1,368
nonjury trials. 30 Some of the jury trials involved murder or other offenses
that are required to be tried by judge and jury.31 Even discounting these
cases involving no option regarding the choice of fact finder, more accused
persons who plead not guilty elected for trial by judge alone rather than
trial by jury.32 When summary conviction offenses are taken into account,
the vast bulk of criminal cases, at least ninety percent, are tried by judge
alone.33 That said, the institution of the criminal jury continues to occupy
an important place in Canadian law.
III. THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE JURY AND THE VERDICT
The composition of the jury list is controlled by provincial and terri-
torial statute, and the general rule in the provinces is that the list is com-
piled by random selection from the electoral rolls in the province or local
community. 34 That means being a Canadian citizen, 18 years of age or
older, and a resident of the jurisdiction in which the trial will be held.35
25. See id. at § 530.
26. Id. at § 531.
27. See infra at pp. 33-38.
28. An internet search provided some data on the incidence of trials across provinces but unfortu-
nately the data do not distinguish between jury trials and trials by judge alone. See Statistics Canada,
Table 7: Completed Cases in Adult Criminal Court, 10 Jurisdictions, 2000/2001 to 2008/2009,
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/I 1293/tbl/tbl7-eng.htm.






34. See GRANGER, supra note 16, at 8-142; see also TANOVICH, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 39-58 (1997) (discussing the selection of jury lists from the Canadian provinces).
35. See GRANGER, supra note 16 at 83-142 for rules from each province and territory.
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Although not too many years ago the typical Canadian jury consisted pri-
marily of white males selected by the local sheriff, the jury has become
much more representative of the population; however, certain classes of
persons will be excluded from jury service. In Ontario, for example, ex-
cluded persons include police officers, lawyers, trustees in bankruptcy, and
employees of the Ministry of the Attorney General.36 Some provinces also
exempt doctors, veterinarians, firefighters, ministers, and law students. 37
Additionally, "person[s] who [have] been convicted of certain criminal
offences within the last five years" are excluded.38
Litigation based on an unrepresentative jury pool is sparse. At the start
of the trial the prosecution or defense may challenge the whole jury array
on the grounds of fraud, partiality, or misconduct, but such challenges have
been infrequent. 39 In R. v. Catizone40 and R. v. Nepoose41 new arrays were
ordered when too few women appeared on the original arrays. In R. v.
Nahdee,42 the accused successfully challenged the array because of irregu-
larities in the selection of aboriginal persons, and in R. v. Born with a
Tooth43 the Crown prevailed on a challenge to irregularities in the selection
of aboriginal citizens. However, challenges to arrays on the grounds that
they did not contain a sufficient proportion of persons of a racial or ethnic
group have tended to fail if there were no irregularities in the selection
process itself.44 If the challenge to the array is not made at the start of trial,
section 670 of the Criminal Code states that any irregularity in the sum-
moning or empanelling of the jury shall not be grounds for reversing a
verdict.45 It is not clear how successful an appeal would be if strong evi-
dence showing deliberate racial or gender biases in selection were pro-
duced after a conviction. Very recently a challenge to the array in Alberta
was made in the case of an aboriginal man on the grounds that the jury pool
had systematically excluded residents of an Indian reservation within that
jurisdiction, but the outcome of that challenge has not yet been resolved.46
36. Id. at 113.
37. See id. at 85 (law students), 100 (doctors, veterinarians, ministers, firefighters).
38. Canadian Jury Duty, CANADIAN LAW, http://www.canadianlawsite.ca/jury-duty.htm(last
visited Jan. 27, 2011).
39. See GRANGER, supra note 16, at 149-5 1.
40. [1972] 23 C.R.N.S. 44 (Can. Ont. Co. Ct.).
41. [1988] 85 Alta. L.R. 2d 8, para.17, 19-21 (Can. Alta. Q.B.).
42. (1993), [1994] 26 C.R. 4th 109 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.).
43. [1993] 10 Alta. L.R. 3d 1, para.4, 6, 12-16 (Can. Alt. Q.B.).
44. GRANGER, supra note 16, at 152-54.
45. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 670.
46. See, Bob Weber, Edmonton Jury Selection Violates Aboriginal Rights, Lawyer Claims, GLOBE
& MAIL, Sep. 12, 2010, availab-
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The criminal jury is always composed of twelve persons. 47 Generally
no provision is made for alternate jurors, and removal of a juror is consi-
dered to be a very serious matter.48 A juror can be discharged, however, if
he or she becomes ill at any time during the course of the trial or there is
some other "reasonable cause" to discharge a juror.49 The judge is also
vested with the power to declare a mistrial. 50 The judge may continue the
trial as long as ten jurors remain. 51 Conviction of an accused by a jury of
ten or eleven members has been held to be constitutional under the Char-
ter.52
With the very important exception of "challenges for cause," which
will be explained and addressed in a separate section below, 53 there is no
equivalent of an American voir dire. The jurors are assumed to be impartial
between the Queen and the accused.54 The legal presumption behind this
practice, as enunciated in a leading case on jury law, R. v. Hubbert, is that a
juror will "perform his duties in accordance with his oath" and render a
verdict with an impartial mind.55 Hubbert discussed additional factors that
bolster this presumption. 56 The jury is composed of twelve persons who
will deliberate and cancel any individual biases that exist.57 Additionally,
Hubbert stated that the judge's instructions to the jury will have a salutary
effect by reminding the jurors that they have a solemn duty to be fair and
impartial. 58 The Hubbert presumption was enunciated even more strongly
in R. v. Corbett,59 a case involving the issue of whether prior convictions of
the accused could be introduced in evidence bearing on character if the
accused chose to testify. Rejecting social science research that indicated
that jurors were influenced by knowledge of criminal records, Corbett as-
leathttp://www.theglobeandmail.com/. ...jury... aboriginal.. ./articlel704674/ - Canada (last visited Jan.
18, 2011).
47. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 631(5), 631(2.1).
48. GRANGER, supra note 16, at 143-44.
49. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 644.
50. Id. at § 644(2).
51. See id. at § 644(2); see also GRANGER, supra note 16, at 190-98 (discussing the discharge of
jurors).
52. See GRANGER, supra note 16, at 197-98.
53. See infra at pp. 18-28.
54. R. v. Hubbert (1975), 11 O.R. 2d 464, para.14 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
55. Idat para. 22. Courts continue to enunciate this legal presumption. SeeR. v. Spence[2005], 3
S.C.R., 458, para. 21-22.
56. Hubbert, 11 O.R. 2d 464 at para. 28.
57. Id at para. 28.
58. See idat para. 56-57.
59. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, para. 41 (Can.).
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serted confidence in the experience of trial judges that firm instructions
from the judge caused juries to perform their duties according to the law.60
The trial judge may ask the assembled panel of prospective jurors if
any of them has health or other problems that would pose a hardship and if
anyone has a relationship with the parties or witnesses in the case, and
those persons may be excused.61 The remaining jurors are then randomly
selected and called one by one to face the accused. 62 Prior to 1992, the
Crown had the right to "stand-aside" (also called "standby") up to forty-
eight prospective jurors with no reason given.63 The stand-aside procedure
was adopted from English practice in the Criminal Code of 1892, with the
rationale for its use being to allow the Crown to eliminate jurors deemed
unfit or hostile to the Crown.64 In 1992, however, in R. v. Bain, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court ruled that stand-asides violated the Charter because a
reasonable person would conclude that it provided the Crown with an un-
fair advantage over the accused.65 Subsequently, Parliament amended the
Criminal Code and abolished stand-asides, but it simultaneously gave the
Crown an equivalent number of peremptory challenges, which prior to this
time only the accused had a right to exercise. 66
In cases involving treason or murder, both the prosecutor and the ac-
cused are entitled to twenty peremptory challenges. 67 For offenses in which
the accused may be sentenced to more than five years in prison, both sides
have twelve peremptory challenges, and for other offenses each side has
four.68 The purposes of the peremptory challenge are recognized as the
same as those originally articulated by Blackstone, who is oft and favorably
quoted on the issue.69The ability to eliminate persons with whom the ac-
cused has an uncomfortable feeling, no matter what the basis behind the
impression of the prospective juror, provides a perception of trial fairness
to the accused. The jury list is provided to both sides shortly before trial,
60. See id. at para 42-43.
61. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 632.
62. Id. at § 631(3).
63. GRANGER, supra note 16, at 144-45.
64. R. v. Bain, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91, para. 52, 54(Can.) (quoting 4 William Blackstone: Commenta-
ries *353). Originally the number of stand-asides was unlimited, but in 1917 the number was reduced to
forty-eight. Id. at para. 52.
65. See id at para. 1, 12.
66. See GRANGER, supra note 16, at 144-45.
67. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 634(2)(a).
68. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 634(2)(a-c).When multiple defendants are
involved in a trial, each co-accused has the same number of allotted peremptory challenges, but the
Crown's number is not increased. See id. at §§ 634(2)(b-c), 634(4).
69. See Bain, I S.C.R. 91, para. 54 (Can.) (quoting 4 William Blackstone: Commentaries *353).
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and the Crown is permitted to examine the list to determine if any of the
jurors have a criminal record.70 Recently, in Ontario, a scandal erupted
when it was discovered that in some instances Crown attorneys had gone
beyond searching for criminal records and conducted background checks of
persons on the jury list.71 That practice has been stopped.72 As we will
discuss below in a separate section, there are important exceptions to the
rule that the jurors are chosen without any questions about their impartiali-
ty. 73
Given the tighter controls in Canada on the trial process, coupled with
the restrictive pretrial questioning of jurors and the fact that legal issues of
jury representativeness are minimized by case law and the Criminal Code,
peremptory challenges have not been as controversial as they have been in
England or the United States. 74 However, R. v. Biddle75 deserves brief
comment because it can be compared with the U.S. case of JE.B. v. Ala-
bama,76 which forbids the use of gender-based peremptory challenges.
Biddle was convicted by an all-female jury of two counts of assault causing
bodily harm and two counts of choking with intent to commit an indictable
offense, largely on the basis of contested eyewitness identification evi-
dence.77 The Crown had exercised its then-available stand-by privileges to
eliminate male jurors. 78Biddle's conviction was overturned on other
grounds; and since Bain had subsequently ruled the stand-by provision
unconstitutional, 79 the question of the all-female jury was only academic.
70. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 638(1)(c).
71. See Shannon Kari, Nova Scotia Prosecutors Deny They Vet Jurors, NAT'L POST, Oct. 9, 2009,
available at
http://www.nationalpost.com/related/topics/Nova+Scotia+prosecutors+deny+they+jurors/2083855/stor
y.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2011); Tim Naumetz, Jury Vetting Practice Used in Nine Trials, LAW
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.lawtimesnews.com/200908105209/Headline-News/Jury-vetting-practice-used-in-nine-trials
(last visited Jan. 18, 2011); Kirk Makin, Ontario Court Upholds Jury Vetting by Police, THE GLOBE &
MAIL, Oct. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontariolontario-court-upholds-jury-vetting-by-policelar
ticlel743401/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
72. Shannon Kari, Ontario Court Refuses To Order New Trial In 'Jury Vetting' Case, NAT'L
POST, Oct. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.canada.com/news/Ontario+court+refuses+order+trial+jury+vetting+case/3627289/story.htm
I (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
73. See infra at pp. 18-28.
74. See Sally Lloyd-Bostock& Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the "Little Parliament": Juries and
Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 23-27 (1999).
75. [1995] 1 S.C.R. 761 (Can.).
76. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
77. Biddle, [1995]I S.C.R. 761 at para.1, 6.
78. Id. at para. 6.
79. Id. at para. 6, 9-10.
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In a concurring opinion, however, one justice commented that "[w]hile
representativeness is not an essential quality of a jury," it is a "characteris-
tic which furthers the perception of impartiality."80 Consequently, the pros-
ecution's "apparent attempt" to modify the jury's composition undermined
jury impartiality.81 In opinions that concurred with overturning the convic-
tion, however, two Justices disagreed with this assessment, with one stat-
ing:
I agree that a jury must be impartial and competent. But, with respect,
the law has never suggested that a jury must be representative. For hun-
dreds of years, juries in this country were composed entirely of men. Are
we to say that all these juries were for that reason partial and incompe-
tent? 82
In short, it is not clear how the Supreme Court would rule in a case in
which one side exercised its peremptory challenges to systematically elimi-
nate jurors on the basis of gender.83
IV. THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF TRIAL
The Canadian trial is somewhat more formal than in the United States.
Although judges no longer wear wigs, their robes have a broad scarlet sash
running from their right shoulder to their waist. 84 The Crown attorneys
prosecuting the case and the defense lawyers also wear black gowns.85
Moreover, upon entering and leaving the bar separating the court officials
from the public gallery, the lawyers execute a slight bow to the judge. Typ-
ically the defendant does not sit at the table with legal counsel but instead
sits in a "prisoner's box." 86
The Crown presents its case first and begins with an opening state-
ment explaining its theory of the case, ordinarily forecasting the witnesses
80. Id. at para. 53.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. A review of a series of cases in which either motions or appeals on the grounds that the attor-
neys, both prosecution and defense, had been using preemptory challenges to eliminate jurors on the
basis of race suggests "judicial reluctance" to weigh in on the issue. See David M. Tanovich, The
Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal
Justice System, 40 S.C.L.R. 2d 655, 667-70, (2008).
84. Handout: Traditions of the Court, ONTARIO JUSTICE EDUCATION
NETWORK,http://www.ojen.ca/sites/ojen.ca/files/sites/default/files/resourcesrraditions%
2 00of%/2Othe%
20Courts.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
85. Handouts for Students, THE COURTS OF
B.C.,http://courtsofbc.caldocuments/Courts-ofBCStudentsHandouts.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
86. The judge does have discretion as to where the accused may sit and may direct a different
seating. See STEPHEN COUGLAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 316 (2008).
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and other evidence that will be called.87 In traditional practice, the defense
was not entitled to address the jury until the Crown had presented its case;
although the defense lawyer did have the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses.88 After the Crown's case was finished, the defense could then
argue that the Crown's evidence was insufficient to prove guilt and request
a dismissal, or, in the alternative, present its rebuttal case. 89 However, in
recent years judges have sometimes permitted the defense opening state-
ments following the Crown's opening statement. 90 In contrast to United
States practice, Canadian judges are permitted more discretion to ask ques-
tions of a witness in order to clarify testimony, although generally they do
this with considerable restraint. 9 1 But in marked contrast to United States
practice and more consistent with English practice, the judge engages in a
"summing up" of the trial evidence as part of his or her charge to the jury.92
The summing up is intended to educate the jury about matters they should
consider in evaluating the witnesses and other evidence but does not in-
fringe upon the jury's discretion. 93
The form of the verdict is ordinarily a general verdict of guilty or not
guilty. The Criminal Code provides two exceptions. 94 The first involves
cases of defamatory libel where the judge may provide the jury a special
verdict.95 The second involves instances of what used to be called the in-
sanity defense but is now called a "Defence of Mental Disorder." 96 If a jury
decides that the accused committed the act but was suffering from a mental
disorder that exempts her from criminal responsibility, it may render such a
verdict.97 In many cases, the jury also has the option of returning a verdict
finding the accused guilty of a lesser-included offense. 98
87. Id.
88. Id. at 319.
89. Id. at 319-20.
90. Id. at 317.
91. Id. at 316.
92. Id. at 327.
93. Id. at 330.
94. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 §§ 16, 317. There appears to be no rule
against special verdicts, but they are only used in cases that fall within these two exceptions.
95. Id. at §317.
96. Id. at § 16. In 1991, in the case of R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (Can.), the insanity de-
fense was successfully challenged; and in 1992, Bill c-30 was enacted, altering the name of the defense
and the wording of the standard revised, Marilyn Pilon, Mental Disorder and Canadian Criminal Law,
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA DEPOSITORY SERVICES PROGRAM, available at http://dsp-
psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb9922-e.htm.
97. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 16.
98. See GRANGER, supra note 16, at 322.
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Sentencing the accused is the responsibility of the judge.99 In 1976
Canada abolished the death penalty and substituted a mandatory life sen-
tence with no eligibility for parole for twenty-five years upon conviction of
first-degree murder,' 00 so jury recommendations are moot on this matter.
However, in instances where an accused who is under the age of eighteen
has been found guilty of first- or second-degree murder, or an accused who
is over the age of eighteen at the time of the offense is found guilty of
second-degree murder, the judge must then tell the jury about the possible
statutory range of the sentence and ask if it wishes to make a recommenda-
tion.101 In the instance of an adult found guilty of second-degree murder,
for example, the judge must then tell the jury that the accused would ordi-
narily be eligible for parole after a mandatory ten-year imprisonment and
ask the jury if it wants to offer a recommendation, although the recommen-
dation is not binding. 102 Case law has established that it is legal error to
inform the jury about possible punishment prior to its verdict on guilty for
any charge, including second-degree murder. 103 "Several provincial courts
have [ruled] that the . . . recommendation does not have to be unanim-
ous."1 04 Finally, the jury's power to decide guilt can be removed if, at the
end of the prosecution's case, the judge decides that the Crown has not
produced a prima facie case for guilt.05 In such an instance, the judge will
enter a directed verdict of not guilty.106
V. BALANCING OF FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL
In February 2002 a joint task force of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police and the Vancouver police executed a search warrant on the farm of
Robert Pickton and his siblings outside of Vancouver as part of a British
99. See id. at 331.
100. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 745. However, until Section 745.6-
745.64, known colloquially as the "Faint Hope Clause," was repealed by Parliament in 201 1,after
fifteen years of a life sentence had been served a convicted person could apply for judicial review of
the sentence. See id. at § 745.6-745.64. If the Chief Justice of the province in which the conviction took
place decided a review was merited, a jury could be empanelled to hear the application and consider a
reduction in the sentence. Id. Two-thirds of the jury had to agree for the sentence to be reduced. Id; see
also David WATT & MICHELLE K. FUERST, TREMEER'S CRIMINAL CODE 1195-1201 (commenting on
these code sections).
101. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, §§ 745.1-745.2; see also GRANGER, supra note 16,
at 331-32 (commenting on this section); WATT & FUERST, supra note 100, at 1189-95 (same).
102. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 745.2.
103. See Watt & Fuerst, supra note 100, at 1189-95 (same).
104. See GRANGER, supra note 16, at 332.




Columbia task force on missing women.107 Shortly after, the farm was
sealed off. 08 Mass media, from a distance, showed scenes of backhoes on
the property.109 Eventually, Pickton was charged with twenty-seven counts
of first degree murder, most of which involved female sex workers and
drug addicts that he had invited to his farm, killed, and dismembered.110
Some of the remains were allegedly fed to his pigs, while other remains
were shipped to a waste processing plant, and still other parts buried on the
farm.111 In jail, Pickton confessed to killing a total of forty-nine women,
making him one of the most notorious mass murderers in modem North
American history. 112 A preliminary inquiry was held in 2003, but there was
a court-ordered ban on publication of the testimony that was not lifted until
August 2010.113
Pickton's trial began in January 2006, and he pleaded not guilty to
twenty-seven counts of murder.1 4 Most of the rest of the year was spent in
legal hearings about what evidence the jury would be permitted to hear.115
Media reporters were allowed to attend the hearings but were forbidden
from publishing any details.' 16 Jury selection began in December 2006
with approximately six hundred prospective jurors (already whittled down
from an initial pool of three thousand five hundred) appearing at the court-
house to begin the process of selecting twelve jurors and two alternates1 17.
107. Jane Anderson, Farm Owners Known for Parties, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 9, 2002 at A4.
108. Update on Vancouver's 69 Missing Women: Murdered by Men, Remembered by Women-
Pickton Found Guilty of Second Degree Murder, WOMEN'S SPACE,
http://womensspace.wordpress.com/2007/12/09/vancouvers-69-missing-women-murdered-by-men-
remembered-by-women/, (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
109. Clifford Kraus, Mounties Dig Up Body Parts in Serial Killer Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2002, available at http://www.missingpeople.net/mounties digupbody_partsin-se.htm.
110. Greg Joyce, Pickton Pleads Not Guilty to 27 Charges, CANADIAN PRESS, Jan. 30, 2006,
available athttp://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/pickton-pleads-not-guilty-to-27-
charges/article810016/; Bodies of Prostitutes Fed to Pigs by Drug Crazed Canadian Serial Killer,
PATrAYA DAILY NEWS, July 17, 2007, available at
http://www.pattayadailynews.com/en/2007/07/17/bodies-of-prostitutes-fed-to-pigs-by-drug-crazed-
canadian-serial-killer/print/.
111. Bodies of Prostitutes Fed to Pigs, supra note 110.
112. Chad Skelton, Video of Pickton's "Jailhouse Confession" to Be Made Public Today,
VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 8, 2010, available at
http://www.vancouversun.com/story print.html?id=3369443&sponsor-..
113. CTV.ca News Staff, Tapes Offer Glimpse into the Mind ofa Killer, CTV NEWS, Aug. 6,2010,
available at http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20100806/pickton-tapes-made-public-100806/.
114. Joyce, supra note 110.
115. Daniel W. Burnett, The Trial of Robert William Pickton, Jan. 26, 2006, available at
http://missingwomen.blogspot.com/2006/02/trial-of-robert-william-pickton.html.
116. Id.
117. Alternates can replace vacancies in the jury that occur between the selection phase and the
commencement of the trial but are dismissed once the trial begins. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46 § 644; See Neal Hall, Pickton Jury Candidates to Face Scrutiny, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 5,
2006, available at http://www.missingpeople.net/picktonjurycandidates.htm. As the judge noted, the
508 [Vol 86:2
THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL JURY
It lasted two days.1s The jury began hearing evidence in January 2007.119
During the trial, a number of charges were dropped for lack of sufficient
evidence.120 In December 2007,Pickton was found guilty of six counts of
second degree murder that carried a "life sentence" of twenty-five years,
the maximum sentence that he would have received if he had been found
guilty of first degree murder.121 The guilty verdict resulted in appellate
litigation, and not until a Canadian Supreme Court decision validated the
jury verdict and judge's sentence was the mass media able to publish mate-
rials about the trial evidence.122 Much of the evidence is now accessible on
the internet. 123
The Pickton case helps to illustrate how the Canadian legal system at-
tempts to maintain a balance between the values of a free press and a fair
trial by controls that the judiciary may place on the mass media to prevent
pretrial publicity. England, with its severe contempt of court laws for those
reporting court proceedings, emphasizes the value of fair trial over free
press.124 The United States, with Nebraska Press Association v. Stuartl25
and related cases, emphasizes the value of free press over fair trial. In con-
trast, Canada attempts to balance the two competing values. Section 11(d)
panel would be too large to accommodate in any one room, and would be seated in locations throughout
the building where they would be linked via audio and video. Id. The prospective jurors were then
divided into groups of thirty and asked to return on Monday, the first day of jury selection, where they
would be expected to be questioned by the judge about their ability to remain impartial. Id
118. Lori Culbert, Jury Selection Complete for Pickton Trial, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 12, 2006,
available at http://missingwomen.blogspot.com/2006/12/jury-selection-complete-for-pickton.html.
119. The Canadian Press, Pickton Guilty of Six Murders, THESTAR.COM, Dec. 10, 2007, available
at http://www.thestar.com/News/article/283961
120. Chad Skelton, Pickton Publication Bans Lifted, 20 Remaining Murder Charges Dropped,
VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 4, 2010, available at
http://www.globaltvbc.com/world/story.html?id=3360372.
121. Associated Press, Canadian Pig Farmer Found Guilty of Multiple Killings, KOMO NEWS,
Dec. 9, 2007) available at
http://www.komonews.com/internalst-print&id=12292796&path=/news/local.; Canada Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 745.
122. Jeremy Hansworth, Canada Court Denies Serial Killer Robert Pickton's Appeal, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jun. 25, 2009, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009384079_apcncanadaserialkiller.html; Lori Cul-




123. See e.g., CBC News, Pickton Investigation to Be Reviewed by B.C., CBC NEWS (Aug. 20,
2010), available at http://www.cbc.calcanada/british-columbia/story/2010/08/20/bc-pickton-report-
released.html; Pickton Background, CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/pickton.
124. See JAMES COBERT, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY 62 (1997); S.H. Bailey, The Con-
tempt of Court Act 1981, 45 MOD. I., REV. 301, 313 (1982); Clive Walker et al., The Reporting of
Crown Court Proceedings and the Contempt of Court Act 1981, 55 MOD. L. REV. 647 (1992).
125. 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1979).
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of the Charter guarantees an accused the right "to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal," and section 2(b) provides for "freedom of
the press and other media of communication."1 26 The Criminal Code also
declares the right to a proceeding in open court. 127 Two sections of the
Code, however, place limits on these rights. Section 537 provides the judge
with the power to exclude everyone but the prosecutor, the accused, and his
counsel from the preliminary inquiry that is ordinarily held for indictable
offenses.128 Section 486 of the Code confers the judge with authority to ban
the public and press from all or part of criminal trial proceedings if it "is in
the interest of public morals, the maintenance of order or the proper admin-
istration of justice."l 29 The apparent contradiction between these sections
of the Code and the Charter guarantees are reconciled by section 1 of the
Charter, which declares that the rights and freedoms are not absolute: "rea-
sonable limits" may be "prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society."1 30
In addition, section 539(1) of the Criminal Code provides that the ac-
cused person has the right to ask for an order banning publication of the
content of the proceedings until the charges are dropped or the trial is
ended.131 The motion must be granted; the judge has no discretion.1 32 The
fact that the preliminary inquiry has been held may be reported, but infor-
mation disclosed at the hearing cannot be reported. Defendants frequently
invoke this right, particularly in cases that are likely to draw public interest.
Consequently, the preliminary inquiry is seldom a source of prejudicial
pretrial publicity.
Canadian trial practice does not allow sidebar conferences: the jury is
removed from the courtroom for all legal arguments.133 The Code pro-
scribes publication of anything said in the absence of the jury until the jury
retires to consider its verdict.134 The jury is sequestered during delibera-
126. Charter, supra note 9, at 2(b), 11(d).
127. See Canada Criminal Code, R. S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 486.
128. See id at 537.
129. See id. at 486.
130. Charter, supra note 9, at 1.
131. See Canada Criminal Code, R S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 539(1).
132. Id.
133. See GRANGER, supra note 16, at 213.
134. Id.
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tion.135 The ban does not apply if the jury is sequestered during the whole
trial, but total sequestration is extremely rare. 136
Two other matters bear on the control of trial prejudice. The first is
that cameras are not permitted in Canadian courtrooms.137 This inhibits
inflammatory publicity in sensational cases like Pickton. The second is that
section 649 of the Criminal Code prohibits jurors from ever disclosing
anything about their deliberations under threat of a summary conviction
that could result in a maximum sentence of six months imprisonment and a
fine of up to $5,000.138 This law, passed in 1972, has the effect of curtail-
ing improper juror motivation to serve on the jury in order to sell the story
of how the jurors perceived the evidence in a high publicity case, as some-
times has occurred in the United States.
The attempt to balance competing values of fair trial and free press
has also met some difficult challenges in the face of Royal commissions of
inquiry. Canadian political culture often encourages the use of formal pub-
lic inquiries in important matters that affect the public interest. 139 In 1995,
the government of Nova Scotia ordered an inquiry into a fatal underground
explosion in the Westray Coal Mine and granted its commissioner the pow-
er to compel testimony of witnesses, including persons who might face
criminal charges. 140 The affected witnesses applied for a temporary stay of
the public hearings on the ground that the publicity would jeopardize their
right to a fair trial.141 Although the appeal was argued on the ground that
the accused would elect a trial by jury, they subsequently elected trial by
judge alone, thereby rendering the issue moot. 142 Nevertheless, in Phillips
135. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 645; see also WATT & FUERST, supra note
100, at 854-55 (commenting on this section).
136. See GRANGER, supra note 16, at 305-06.
137. Recent appeals by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to broadcast live coverage of a
sensational Vancouver polygamy trial was refused by the by B.C. Chief Justice, declaring that it was
"not the time to advance the debate" regarding television cameras in Canadian courtrooms. J.J.
MCCULLOUGH, Polygamy Trial Will Not be Televised, METRO VANCOUVER, (Nov. 23, 2010); see also
DANIEL J. HENRY, Electronic Public Access to Court: A Proposal for Its Implementation Today (1985),
available , at
http://www.adidem.org/Electronic-PublicAccess_to_Court:_A_Proposal for its _Implementation_Tod
ay; DANIEL J. HENRY, Electronic Public Access To Court: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, (1994)
available at http://www.adidem.org/ElectronicPublicAccessToCourt-
An Idea Whose Time Has Come.
138. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s 649, s 787(1).
139. See e.g.,W.R. Derrick Sewell & Timothy Oriordan, The Culture of Participation in Envtl.
Decision Making, 16 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 8 (1976).
140. Phillips v. Nova Scotia, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97, para. 20 (Can.).




v. Nova Scotia,143 the Supreme Court addressed the problem of pretrial
publicity generated by public inquiries. The court conceded that publicizing
evidence might "irreparably" prejudice jurors, but it emphasized the impor-
tance of public interest in the inquiry and placed the burden of proof on the
accused to demonstrate the link between publicity and harm. 144 In the deci-
sion, the Court stated:
The objective of finding 12 jurors who know nothing of the facts of a
highly-publicized case is today, patently unrealistic... [I]mpartiality can-
not be equated with ignorance of all facts of the case.. . [I]n order to
hold a fair trial it must be possible to find jurors who, although familiar
with the case, are able to discard previously formed opinions and to em-
bark upon their duties armed with both an assumption that the accused is
innocent until proven otherwise, and a willingness to determine liability
based solely on the evidence presented at trial. 145
Phillips asserted that any remedy must be weighed against existing
procedural safeguards relating to jury prejudice (such as judicial instruc-
tions and challenges for cause). 146 Moreover, Philips sanctioned temporary
publication bans of harmful testimony or the conclusions of the inquiry
until completion of the criminal proceedings.147
R.v. Kennyl48 and R. v. Burkel49 involved a 1989 public inquiry in-
volving charges of obstruction of justice in the investigation of rampant
sexual assaults on boys in the Mt. Cashel Orphanage in St. John, New-
foundland by numerous members of the Christian Brothers, a Catholic
religious order, who were in charge of the institution. Despite defense mo-
tions to delay the inquiry until after the trials of the accused or at least to
place a ban on publication, the hearing took place and was covered live on
television.150 The testimony was very graphic, covering what occurred and
who was involved. 151 The problem was exacerbated by statements prejudi-
cial to the accused by public officials. Additionally, the convictions of the
first members to stand trial received extensive media coverage in New-
143. Id. at para. 20.
144. Id. at para. 108, 158.
145. Id. at 143.
146. See id. at 145.
147. See id.
148. R v. Kenny, [1996] 445 A.P.R. 250, para.3 (Nfld. C.A.).
149. R. v. Burke, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 474, para. 11 (Can.).
150. Kenny, 445 A.P.R. at para. 3.
151. See James R. P. Ogloff and Neil Vidmar, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors: A Study
to Compare the Relative Effects of Television and Print Media in a Child Sex Abuse Case, 18 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 507, 509 (1994) (describing the testimony that appeared on television as well as a sum-
mary of other background material about the case).
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foundland and across Canada. Kenny, one of the accused, moved for a
permanent stay of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial pretrial publici-
ty. 152 The trial judge, while conceding that the publicity had prejudiced the
community, nevertheless concluded that the risk of bias could be neutra-
lized by jury selection procedures and judicial instructions, and denied the
motion. 153 Kenny then elected trial by judge alone and was convicted. 154
His appeal of the denial of the motion to stay was affirmed by the Canadian
Supreme Court.155
Another case involving Christian Brothers resulted in Dagenaisv. Ca-
nadian Broadcasting Corp.156 In this instance, former and present members
of the Christian Brothers who ran a Catholic training school in Ontario
were also charged with multiple counts of sexual and physical abuse of
young boys who were in their care. 157 As their trial date approached, their
defense lawyers applied for an injunction preventing the Canadian Broad-
casting Corporation ("CBC") from airing a television mini-series program,
The Boys of St. Vincent, a fictional account based upon Newfoundland's
Mt. Cashel Orphanage cases. 158 Relying on common law authority, the trial
judge granted a nationwide injunction on the airing of the CBC series until
after the Ontario trials were finished.'5 9 The Ontario court of Appeal
upheld the injunction but limited its scope to Ontario and the city of Mon-
treal.160 Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court applied a balancing test
under section 1 of the Charter and quashed the injunction.161
The Dagenais decision did not absolutely curb common law judicial
authority on publication bans, but it enunciated guidelines limiting the
scope of such bans and requiring the weighing of potential harms to free
expression against some combination of alternative remedial measures,
such as adjourning trials, changing venues, sequestering jurors, allowing
challenges for cause, and providing strong judicial direction to the jury. 162
The decision was based on a balancing of the salutary effects of publication
ban on the fairness of the trial against the deleterious effects delaying free
152. R v. Kenny, [1996] 445 A.P.R. 250, para. 3 (Nfld. C.A.).
153. Id. at para. 9.
154. See R. v. Kenny, [1996] 445 A.P.R. 250, para. 1, (Can.).
155. Id. at para. 14.
156. Dagenais v. Canadian Broad.Corp, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, para. 2 (Can.).
157. Id.
158. Id. at para. 6.
159. Id.
160. Id. at para. 1.
161. Id. at paras. 77, 83.
162. See Dagenais v. Canadian Broad. Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, para. 2 (Can.).
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expression guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter.163 In fact, Dagenais
asserted that, unlike the American model of a clash between free press and
fair trial, section 1 of the Charter requires a balancing of values.164 It also
noted that freedom of expression and the accused's right to a fair trial is not
always in conflict, such as when public scrutiny of the court process may
protect the fairness of trials.165 Finally, Dagenais noted that publication
bans can also protect the privacy of members affected by trial and other
interests. 166 It is important to make clear that even in cases similar to the
Mt. Cashel and Pickton cases, publication injunctions involve delay, not
permanent bans, on the reporting of relevant court proceedings.
VI. EXCEPTIONAL CASES: CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE IN CASES INVOLVING
EXTRAORDINARY PUBLICITY OR RACIAL PREJUDICE
In contrast to peremptory challenges, there is also a provision in Ca-
nadian law for what are termed "challenges for cause," and these chal-
lenges have evoked considerable controversy over the past few decades. 167
They occur with greater frequency in the province of Ontario, with judges
in other provinces frequently ruling against challenges for cause.
As a first matter, however, attention needs to be drawn to the fact, al-
luded to earlier, that the Canadian judge does not have the power to dismiss
individual jurors from the array on the grounds of partiality.168 Although
the judge is allowed to dismiss some persons if he or she determines in
open court that the potential juror has a personal interest in the matter to be
tried, has a relationship with the judge or any of the parties or witnesses to
the suit, or would suffer personal hardship or suffers from a disability, 169
Canada presumes that jurors will be impartial. As articulated first in Hub-
bert,170 but reiterated in cases that have followed:
163. Id at para. 12.
164. Id.atpara l2, 85.
165. Id. at para. 86.
166. Id. at para. 87.
167. See Austin M. Cooper, Q.C., The ABCs of Challenge for Cause in Jury Trials: To Challenge
or Not to Challenge and What to Ask if You Get It, 37 CRIM. L. Q. 62, 62 (1994); DAVID M. TANOVICH,
RETHINKING JURY SELECTION: CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, 30
CRIMINAL REPORTS 4th 310 (1994); David Paciocco, Challenges for Cause: Cameron and Sexual
Offence Cases (Apr. 1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Steven Skura, Challenge for
Cause: Questions Allowed Since R. v. Parks (Nov. 11. 1994) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
168. TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 34, at 81-83, 161.
169. See TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 34, at 77-83.
170. R. v. Hubbert, [1975] 11 O.R. 2d 464, para. 56 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
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[Canada's] criminal law is premised on the ability of 12 jurors to do their
job with "indifference" as between the Crown and the accused.... Our
procedures in this respect differ from the American approach. In this
country, people called for jury duty benefit from a presumption that they
will do their duty without bias and prejudice.171
Since the legal presumption is that a juror is impartial, the burden of
proof for overcoming the presumption lies with the party requesting the
challenge. Overwhelmingly, challenges for cause are brought by the ac-
cused. The standard of proof is an "air of reality" or a "realistic poten-
tial" 72 that (1) a widespread bias exists in the community; and (2) that
some jurors may be incapable of setting aside this bias, despite trial safe-
guards, to render an impartial decision. 173The evidence introduced to rebut
the presumption of impartiality can take a variety of forms: newspaper
articles, testimony by persons knowledgeable of the community, and expert
opinion by social scientists, sometimes buttressed with a public opinion
survey designed specifically for the case. 174 Although the standard of proof
is relatively low, judicial resistance to motions for such challenges plus the
cost of producing persuasive evidence serve to inhibit requests for chal-
lenges for cause in many cases.
Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of judges have taken judicial
notice of the existence of various forms of prejudice in permitting chal-
lenges for cause, 175 but the judiciary has kept a tight rein on the form of the
questions that may be asked of jurors. In response to concerns about
"American-style" voir dire, Hubbert asserted that the "[c]hallenge for cause
is not for the purpose of finding out what kind of juror the person called is
171. R v. Spence, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458, para. 21(Can.). The court stated that "[olur collective expe-
rience is that when men and women are given a role in determining the outcome of a criminal prosecu-
tion, they take the responsibility seriously; they are impressed by the jurors' oath and the solemnity of
the proceedings; they feel a responsibility to each other and to the court to do the best job they can; and
they listen to the judge's instructions because they want to decide the case property on the facts and the
law." Id at para. 22.
172. See TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 34, at 95-100.
173. As articulated in R. v. Find, "The two components of the test involve distinct inquiries....
They are not watertight compartments, but rather guidelines for determining whether, on the record
before the court, a realistic possibility exists that some jurors may decide the case on tha basis of pre-
conceived attitudes or beliefs, rather than the evidence placed before them. "[2001] 1 S.C.R. 863, para.
33 (Can.).
174. See TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 34, at 137-47; Neil Vidmar& Julius Melnitzer, Juror
Prejudice: An Empirical Study of a Challenge for Cause, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 487, 491-93 (1984).
175. When the race of the parties might be an issue, recent case law has asserted that the accused
need only present a prima facie case to challenge on grounds of potential racial bias, R. v. Wilson,
[1996] 107 C.C.C. 3d 86, para. 21 (Can. Ont. C.A.); see also TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 34, at 110-
113 (discussing jury selection in Ontario when the accused is Black).
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likely to be-his personality, beliefs, prejudices, likes or dislikes." 76 As a
result, the challenge procedure involves a brief, structured questioning of
the prospective juror by the lawyer invoking the challenge,177 typically the
defense lawyer, with the potential jury panel usually removed from the
courtroom while prospective jurors are called in individually and ques-
tioned. 7 8 Ordinarily, the questions put to jurors are limited in number,
frequently only one or two in number, and take a forced choice response
format, requiring only yes or no answers. 179 Usually the questions are writ-
ten out in advance and approved by the judge. Foremost, the questions
must directly address the juror's state of mind. 8 0
Also unique to Canada-and in contrast to the American voir dire
procedure where the judge renders the decision on the prospective juror's
impartiality-this determination is made by persons from the jury panel
who are called "triers."181 Two individuals from the panel are randomly
selected as triers to begin the process.182 A third person is randomly called
from the assembled jury panel, put under oath and presented with the chal-
lenge questions that the judge has approved. The two triers then confer as a
sort of mini-jury on whether the questioned juror is impartial.183 If they
decide that he or she is not impartial that person is excused and a fourth
juror is called etc. After a first juror is deemed impartial (and has survived
peremptory challenges by the prosecution or defense which is exercised
after the judgment of impartiality) the sworn juror becomes the first mem-
ber of the actual jury. One of the two original triers is then excused, and the
second trier, along with Juror No.1 assesses the impartiality of prospective
jurors until Juror No. 2 is selected, after which the other original trier is
176. Hubbert v. R., [1975] 39 C.C.C. 2d 279, para. 24 (Ont. C.A.); see GRANGER, supra note 16, at
181-86; TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 34, at 147-50. In most cases, judges have held that it is inappro-
priate to ask jurors whether they are members of a particular race or class of society, about their person-
al experiences such as whether the juror or a member of the juror's family has been the victim of an
offense, and what the prospective juror's beliefs are, including whether they belong to any groups, such
as a victim support group, or fraternize with particular ethnic or racial groups.
177. In some jurisdictions, it is the judge who questions the jurors, for example, this common
practice in the province of Alberta. See Alberta Rules of Court Project, Criminal Jury Trials: Challenge
for Cause Procedures. Consultation Memorandum no. 12.20, para. 35 (April, 2007); P. J. Royal Q. C.,
Jury Selection - Challenge for Cause: A Case Study, presented at the Criminal Trial Lawyers' Associa-
tion Short Snappers Seminar, Edmonton, October 22, 2005.
178. See Neil Vidmar, Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials, 21
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 5,9 (1997).
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 8-9; Neil Vidmar & Regina Schuller, The Jury: Selection Of Twelve Impartial
Peers, in INTRODUCTION TO L. AND PSYCHOL.: CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES 126, 146-148 (Regina A.
Schuller and James R. P. Ogloff eds., 2001).
182. Vidmar, supra note 188, at 9.
183. Vidmar, supra note 188, at 9.
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excused. This process then continues with Jurors 1 and 2 assessing impar-
tiality for the selection of Juror No. 3.184 Then, Jurors 2 and 3 assess impar-
tiality to select Juror No. 4, and so on until 12 jurors are impaneled.185
Thus through this rotating process the final jury is a jury composed of per-
sons who have been deemed impartial by two of their fellow jurors. Ordi-
narily, as noted earlier, the jury panel is removed from the courtroom for
the process on the theory that observing the questioning may affect how
prospective jurors respond, but this decision is left to the judge and, on the
grounds of efficiency, in some cases the panel remains in the courtroom for
the selection procedure.186
In the early 1990s, the potential for racial bias in trials involving Black
defendants was explicitly acknowledged in R. v. Parks,187 and since this
time lawyers have been permitted to question prospective jurors in trials
involving not only Black accused but also other visible minority defen-
dants. 188 The format of this questioning has been very restrictive, however,
with the focus solely on the potential for the expression of bias in jurors'
decisions.
In R. v. Parks, the leading authority on the issue, the jurors were
asked:
As the judge will tell you, in deciding whether or not the prosecution has
proven the charge against an accused a juror must judge the evidence of
the witnesses without bias, prejudice or partiality:
In spite of the judge's direction would your ability to judge wit-
nesses without bias, prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact
that there are people involved in cocaine and other drugs?189
Would your ability to judge the evidence in the case without bias,
prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that the person charged
is a black Jamaican immigrant and the deceased is a white man?190
184. TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 35, at 164.
185. See TANOVICH ET AL, supra, note 34. The history of this procedure in Canada has not been
explored, but it undoubtedly comes directly from English law. See JAMES KENNEDY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF JURIES 90 (1826);Nancy King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the
Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CH. I. REV. 433, 467-73 (1998) (documenting the exis-
tence of triers in colonial and post-colonial America).
186. For a description of challenge for cause in another case and an assessment of its effectiveness,
see generally Vidmar & Melnitzer, supra note 174. The authors describe the challenge for cause
process as carried out in a child killing trial in which the whole panel remained in the courtroom during
the challenge process. Id. at 494-511.
187. R. v. Parks, [1993] 84 C.C.C. 3d 353, para 22 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
188. R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 at para. 1-2 (Can.).
189. Parks, 84 C.C.C. 3d 353 at para. 16.




In what has been referred to as an "Ontario Court of Appeal quartet"
by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Spence,191 Ontario courts have
ruled that the Parks question should be permitted in any trial in Ontario
where the accused is black (R. v. Wilson)192 or where the accused is a
member of any visible non-Caucasian minority, without the formal proof of
community prejudice required to do so (R. v. Koh).193 In R. v. Campbell,194
the fourth in the quartet, the accused, a black man, was charged with sex-
ually assaulting a sixteen-year-old white woman. Although the trial court
judge permitted the defense to ask the Parks question, he refused to include
any reference in the question to the fact that the complainant was white.195
On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had erred
by failing to permit the defense "to inquire into the critical concern of par-
tiality that may flow solely from the interracial nature of the offence."l 96
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court again considered the issue of
the interracial mix of the accused/victim in the challenge question, in this
case a Black man convicted of robbing an East Indian man. 197 Like R. v.
Campbell, the trial court judge had permitted the defense to challenge ju-
rors for cause on the grounds of a potential bias against a Black accused but
refused to permit the challenge to include the race of the victim.198 On
appeal, the Ontario Court set aside the conviction, ruling that the accused
was entitled to include the interracial nature of the crime in the question.199
When the decision was appealed, however, the Supreme Court of Canada
restored the conviction holding that it was within the trial judge's discretion
whether to permit the inclusion of the interracial nature of the crime and
that the defense in this case had failed to show an "air of reality" to the
assertion that the victim's East Indian origin had the potential of aggravat-
ing jurors' prejudice against a black accused. 200
191. See R v. Spence, [200513 S.C.R 458, para. 27 (Can.).
192. R. v. Wilson, [1996] 107 C.C.C. 3d 86, para. 21 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
193. R. v. Koh, [1998]131 C.C.C. 3d 257, para. 30 (Can. Ont. C.A.). The court, inR. v. Koh, a case
involving charges of narcotics trafficking, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that racism was not
unique or indigenous against blacks and extended the challenge to a person of Asian/Chinese origin. In
its ruling it stated that "in spite of the absence of compelling evidence in support of Sherratt threshold
test, it is not to be doubted that racist sentiment against persons of Chinese origin is present ... and in
sufficient numbers to raise serious concerns." Id. at para. 25. The court went further ruling that "the
same would apply to all visible non-Caucasian minorities." Id. at para. 30.
194. R. v. Campbell, [1999] 139 C.C.C. 3d 258, para. 2.
195. Id. at para. 3.
196. Id. at para. 7.
197. R. v. Spence, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458, para. I (Can.).
198. Id
199. Id. at para. 17.
200. Id. at para. 72. In R. v Spence, the accused, complainant, principal witnesses and jurors were
not all of the same race. Id. at para. 1. The Supreme Court held that "it was within the discretion of the
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The reasoning of the Parks decision was subsequently extended in
British Columbia in the case of an aboriginal man facing charges of rob-
bery of a white employee of a pizza store. In R. v. Williams, both the trial
judge and the British Columbia Court of Appeal denied the motion for a
challenge for cause. 201 While acknowledging that there was widespread
prejudice against aboriginal people in the community, the judges asserted
that there was no evidence of a nexus between prejudice and the ability of
the jurors to decide the case impartially if the jurors were properly in-
structed by the trial judge.202 The defense appealed, and in R. v. Williams,
the Canadian Supreme Court, in a unanimous nine-zero decision, ruled that
the challenge should have been allowed and directed a new trial. 203 The
Court recognized four basic types of potential prejudice, including racial
prejudice,204 and their potential influences on jurors. Nevertheless, the
decision still asserted the trial judge's discretion to decide the merits of
challenges for cause on a case-by-case basis.205
Since its introduction to the courts, the challenge for cause procedure
and question format has remained virtually unaltered. Most often the judge
does not allow further exploration of the juror's reasoning behind the an-
trial judge to decline a challenge for cause targeting the "interracial element" of the crime. While the
fact that the accused was black justified a challenge for cause on that basis, the additional fact that the
[complainant] was of East Indian origin did not compound the prejudice and therefore did not need to
be the subject of a separate inquiry to potential jurors." Id. at para. 41-42, 78.
201. R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, para. 5, 7 (Can.).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 59-60.
204. Id at para. 10. In its decision, the court articulated 4 different forms of prejudice: 1) Interest
prejudice, sometimes also called manifest or "obvious" prejudice, involves jurors who may have a
direct stake in the trial outcome or at least whose presence would appear to be unfair to one of the
parties, 2) Specific prejudice, exists when the juror holds attitudes or beliefs about the specific case at
trial that would prevent him or her from deciding guilt or innocence with an impartial mind. These
attitudes and beliefs could arise from personal knowledge about the case, pre-trial publicity through the
media, or discussion and rumor about the case through social networks within the community (which
now also includes online networks), 3) generic, or general, prejudice stems not from jurors' beliefs or
knowledge about the specific case, but rather the application of preexisting attitudes or beliefs jurors
may hold about the crime committed or its participants (e.g., accused, victim/complainant) that interfere
with their ability to be fair and impartial. As contrasted to specific prejudice, knowledge about the case
or the particular identities of the trial participants is immaterial. Rather, it is the perceived characteris-
tics of the parties or the crime itself that may prevent the juror from deciding the case without bias (e.g.,
the accused is judged on the basis of his or her identity as a member of a group, rather than on the
specific facts brought out in the trial evidence), and finally 4) conformity prejudice exists when the juror
perceives that there is such strong community interest in a particular outcome of a trial that he or she is
influenced in reaching a verdict consistent with perceived community feeling and sentiment rather than
through an impartial evaluation of the trial evidence. The language and reasoning in Williams was taken
directly from an amicus brief by the second author of this article, and that in turn was based on Neil
Vidmar, Case Studies of Pre-and Midtrial Prejudice in Criminal and Civil Litigation, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 73, 76-82 (2002).
205. Williams, I S.C.R. at 1128, para. 30.
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swer and the triers make their decision based on the prospective juror's yes
or no response as to whether he or she can be fair and impartial. As Tano-
vich notes, "R. v. Parks stands out as one of the most significant Charter
race cases," and the cases that followed it have clearly established that
Aboriginal accused and other accused who may be stigmatized by forms of
racial or ethnic prejudice are entitled to challenge prospective jurors for
bias, but as the discussion that follows suggests, "the limited questioning
allowed in challenge for cause renders it an imperfect device for ferreting
out prejudice." 206
Motions by defense lawyers to expand the scope of the standard Parks
question format have been proffered but have been unsuccessful. In R. v.
Gayle,207 the defense attempted to ask prospective jurors a series of ques-
tions that touched upon their general attitudes towards Blacks (e.g., "Would
you agree or disagree that some races are, by their nature, more violent than
others?"), as well as their assessments of the impact such attitudes would
have on their behavior (e.g., "Would your ability to judge the evi-
dence .. . without bias, prejudice or partiality, be affected by the fact that
the person charged is a Black Jamaican immigrant and the victims are
White police officers?"), arguing that the expansion of the questioning
would better equip "the triers to determine both attitudinal and behavioural
partiality." 208 This separation was adopted for the questioning that occurred
relating to the pretrial publicity and association with the police that sur-
rounded the case.209 Drawing on Parks and Williams, however, the appel-
late court held that although "there are two discrete aspects of partiality to
be addressed by the triers, I do not read them as requiring discrete ques-
tions on each aspect of partiality." 210 In short, the single rolled up question
was deemed sufficient.211 It is worth noting, however, that in its decision
the court stated,
206. Its utility hampered "by the failure of the courts to permit a more sophisticated manner of
questioning. TANOVICH, supra note 34, at 683.
207. R v. Gayle, [2001] 54 O.R. 3d 36 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
208. Gayle, 54 O.R. 3d 36 at para. 11, 15. In a Qudbec case, R. v. Mankwe, similar questions were
proposed (e.g., 'Do you believe that black persons commit more crimes in Canada than persons of other
races ? Do you believe that black persons have a greater tendency to lie than persons of other races?)
but not permitted, with this decision upheld by the Qudbec Court of Appeal. [1997] 12 C.R. 5th 273.
This latter decision was appealed to Supreme Court of Canada, and allowing the appeal, the Court
ordered a new trial. R v. Mankwe, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 3, para. I (Can.).
209 Gayle, 54 0.R.3d at para 10.
210. Id. at para 18. Two defense expert witnesses argued the utility of the separation in the inquiry,
while an opposing expert argued for the rolled up question format. Id at para.24, 27.
211 Id.atpara.33.
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It may well be that with the benefit of experience and the help of expert
analysis on how best to uncover and assess racial bias, the challenge for
cause process can be improved over time.212
Most recently, in R. v. Douse, the defense once again attempted to
augment the Parks procedure with additional questions and to separate the
Parks question into two parts.213 As in the Gayle decision, the trial judge
was not persuaded that the question should be broken into two parts, reach-
ing this conclusion on the grounds that it resulted in a "realistic potential to
have challenges for cause determined on the basis of prejudice and not
partiality." 214
Some more limited alterations have now been accepted in Ontario. In
Douse215 and cases that have followed it (R. v. Joseph & Parris)216 pros-
pective jurors, once sworn in, were provided with a written copy of the
question217 and a response format that utilized a four choice response for-
mat:
Which answer most accurately reflects you answer to that question:
(a) I would not be able to judge this case fairly
(b) I might be able to judge this case fairly
(c) I would be able to judge this case fairly
(d) I do not know if I would be able to judge this case fairly. 218
Although the challenge procedure as it pertains to racial bias has been
in place for some time, research assessing its efficacy has been sparse.
Theorizing and research on prejudice and discrimination would suggest that
the efficacy of the procedure in terms of weeding out prejudiced jurors may
be questionable. As a number of psychological studies indicate, awareness
of one's general biases and their potential impact, even at the best of times,
is no simple matter.219 Recent affective forecasting studies demonstrate that
in general people are often ignorant as to how they will respond to actual
212. Id. at para. 34.
213. R. v. Douse, [2009] 246 C.C.C.3d 227, para. 4 (Can. Ont.).
214. Id. at para. 224.
215. Id. at para. 281.
216. Regina v. Joseph and Parris [2009], Court file No. CR-08-00002909-0000.
217. "As the judge will tell you, in deciding whether or not the prosecution has proven the charge
against an accused, a juror must judge the evidence of the witnesses without bias, prejudice, or partiali-
ty. Would you ability to judge the evidence in this case without bias, prejudice or partiality be affected
by the fact that the people charged are black?" Regina v. Joseph and Parris, Court file No. CR-08-
00002909-0000, August 21, 2009.
218. Id.
219. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports
on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 233 (1977).
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situations and are often woefully wrong in their beliefs about the impact of
various cues and social categories on their emotional and behavioral res-
ponses.220 More specifically, research related to aversive racism suggests
that people may be unaware of existing biases and often maintain that they
are personally fair and egalitarian, 221 with research demonstrating that,
while many people do not believe that they themselves are biased against
Blacks, there is strong empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. 222 Fur-
thermore, even if people are able to identify the possibility that they may be
biased against Blacks, they may not fully understand how and to what ex-
tent biases can affect their decisions or may not correct for their partiality if
they lack the motivation or cognitive capacity to counteract these atti-
tudes. 223
Schuller recently conducted an in-depth examination of the actual jury
selection proceedings of seventeen Ontario criminal cases in which the
challenge was invoked.224 Using trial records of the actual selection phase
of the trial, it was found that, consistent with simulation research, a minori-
ty of prospective jurors responded in the affirmative to the challenge ques-
tion (ranging from zero to fourteen percent across the seventeen cases). 225
The percentage of prospective jurors who were deemed 'unacceptable' by
the triers, however, far exceeded jurors' self reported disclosures of partial-
ity (nine to thirty-four percent across the cases), 226 suggesting that the triers
appear to be basing their decisions on other factors than just potential racial
bias. Just what those factors are remain unclear, but preliminary analyses
suggest that general cues indicative of uncertainty or comprehension may
play a role. For instance, any hesitation on the part of the prospective juror
220. See e.g., Kerry Kawakami et al., Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Responses to Racism,
323 SCIENCE 276, 276 (2009) (although research participants predicted they would be upset by a
racist act, they showed little emotional distress).
221. For instance, Johnson et al. found that although White mock jurors in a simulation study were
more influenced by incriminating inadmissible evidence when a defendant was Black (as opposed to
White), they reported feeling less affected by the inadmissible evidence than participants in a White
defendant inadmissible condition. J. D. Johnson et al., Justice is Still Not Colorblind: Diferential
Racial Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893,
896 (1995).
222. Id.
223. See generally Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Correction Model: The
Role of Naive Theories of Bias in Bias Correction, in 29 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
141-208 (M. P. Zanna ed. 1997).
224. Regina A. Schuller, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Issues of Partiality, 4th Int'l Congress of
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in his/her response, or expressed difficulty with the language, typically
resulted in the triers finding the juror "unacceptable." 227
In addition to the question of whether or not the current challenge
for cause procedure can successfully identify individuals who would likely
demonstrate bias, Schuller and her colleaguesin a simulation study ex-
amined the impact of the procedure on the decisions of those who survived
the screening of partiality. 228 While some suggest that the procedure may
enhance the jurors' ability to remain impartial, a claim asserted in Parks229
and echoed in subsequent decisions,230 it was found that, consistent with
some of the social psychological research and theorizing, participation in
the challenge process did not reduce their expression of bias. A more ref-
lective strategy that permitted the mock jurors to first consider how race
might impact their assessments, however, did demonstrate a reduction in
bias.231 In short, while the yes or no format of the challenge question did
little to ameliorate racial bias, a more reflective pre-trial questioning format
appeared to hold considerable promise.232
It is reasonable to conclude that the challenge for cause is a procedural
remedy that is in a state of change and development. Although the various
appeal court decisions have stated that the law as defined in Hubbert has
not changed, the empirical result in Ontario has been a substantial expan-
sion of the right to challenge for cause, accompanied with a partial retren-
chment regarding sexual offense-based challenges. 233 The Parks case and
227. Schuller, supra note 224; see also R. v. Douse, [20091 246 C.C.C.3d 227, para. 125-137 (Can.
Ont. C.A.) (Jonathon Freedman, a social psychologist, reported on similar results when he provided
testimony in R. v. Douce).
228. Regina A. Schuller, Veronica Kazoleas, & Kerry Kawakami, The Impact of Prejudice Screen-
ing Procedures on Racial Bias in the Courtroom, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 320, 324 (2009);
Schuller, supra note 224.
229. R. v. Parks, [1993], 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353, para. 92 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
230. R. v. Koh, [1998], 131 C.C.C. (3d) 257, para. 44 (Can. Ont. CA.).
231. Schuller, supra note 228.
232. Similar results have been found by Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group
Decision-Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 609-10 (2006). In a juror simulation study conducted by Som-
mers, mock jurors who participated in a race relevant voir dire designed to induce participants to think
about their racial attitudes and how these might affect their overall reactions to the trial, in comparison
to participants who received race neutral pre-trial questioning, were less likely to find a Black accused
guilty. Id. The court in the Douse decision also noted the potential merits of letting jurors know the
question earlier, thus allowing the prospective jurors time to reflect upon how racial attitudes might
influence their treatment of the evidence. R. v. Douse, [2009] 246 C.C.C.3d 227, para. 82 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
233. In R. v Find, a case involving charges of sexual offences involving children, the Supreme
Court established that demonstrating partiality on the basis of the nature of the crime will be difficult.
Although not suggesting that "an accused can never be prejudiced by the mere fact of the nature and
circumstances of the charges[,]" the court stated that in the case of offence-based bias, establishing "the
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its progeny and the Williams decision are at once recognition of changing
social conditions in Canada and an attempt to provide a remedy to foster
the legal goal of a fair trial and public perceptions of fairness.
VII. CROWN APPEAL OF AN ACQUITTAL
It would be remiss to fail to mention a striking feature of Canadian
law. While the Charter gives great weight to the presumption of innocence,
the Crown does have a limited right to appeal a jury acquittal. The Code
provides that the Attorney General has the right to appeal a verdict of ac-
quittal or a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental dis-
order.234 The ground for an appeal must involve an issue of law, 235 such as
a claim that the jury was not properly instructed on the law. This limitation
on double jeopardy requires a thorough review by appeal courts, but on
occasion the Crown has been successful in obtaining a new trial. In 1986,
in a highly publicized case, Guy Paul Morin was found not guilty of the
murder of nine-year-old Christine Jessup. 236 His primary defense was an
alibi defense, but this was complicated by psychiatric testimony that Morin
was suffering from severe schizophrenia such that if he did commit the
crime, he would not have appreciated the nature and quality of the act.237
The Ontario Attorney General filed an appeal on the grounds that the judge
misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt and that it had been improperly
instructed about Morin's psychiatric condition. 238 The Ontario Court of
Appeal reversed the verdict and ordered a new trial. 239 The Supreme Court
of Canada upheld the reversal with respect to the reasonable doubt instruc-
tion.240 In his second trial, the issue of schizophrenia was abandoned but
the alibi defense was expanded. 241 Despite new evidence of serious police
misbehavior, unreliable witnesses, and demonstration of unreliable forensic
conclusions regarding hair and fiber samples, after nine months of trial
testimony, the jury found Morin guilty of first-degree murder following a
circumstances in which it is found to be both widespread in the community and resistant to the safe-
guards of trial may prove exceptional." [2001] I S.C.R. 863, at para. 108 (Can. Ont.).
234. See Canada Criminal Code, R. S. C. 1985, c. C-46, § 676.
235. Id.
236. See R. v. Morin, [1987] 36 C. C. C. 3d 50 (Ont. C.A.) For a synopsis of the Morin case from
beginning to end, see Jack King, The Ordeal of Guy Paul Morin: Canada Copes with Systemic Injus-




239. See R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345, para. 9 (Can.).
240. See id. at para. 84.
241. R .v Morin, 1992 Carswell Ont. 1779 (WL Can) (Ont. Gen Div).
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week of deliberations. 242 Morin appealed, but while the appeal was pending
DNA evidence that had not been available during the first two trials elimi-
nated Morin as the killer and his conviction was set aside.243 A subsequent
public inquiry into justice system failures resulted in the lengthy 1998
Kaufman Report that made many recommendations regarding criminal
procedure and the jury system. 244
The Morin case followed by more than two decades a change in Ca-
nadian Law, known as the Morgentaler Amendment, 245 that had allowed an
appeals court to actually substitute a verdict of guilty despite a jury finding
of not guilty. The Code now only allows ordering a new trial based on mat-
ters of law.246 The jury is the sole interpreter of the facts. Nevertheless,
even with these restrictions, section 676, as Morin demonstrates, is another
judicial constraint on the jury.
VIII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
As in the United States, the Canadian courts continue to grapple with
issues of reliability, utility, and admissibility of expert evidence. 247 The
concerns have focused around both forensic evidence from the natural
sciences such as DNA tests, fiber samples, and explosive residue, as well as
expert evidence that falls more squarely within the domain of the behavior-
al sciences (e.g., evidence such as Battered Woman Syndrome, Child Sex-
ual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome," reliability of eyewitness
242. Id. at 12.
243. R v. Morin 37 C.R. (4th) 395 (Ont C.A.).
244. HON. FRED KAUFMAN, REPORT OF THE KAUFMAN COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING
GUY PAUL MORIN (1998), available at
http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/. To date no formal legal response
to this report has been made.
245. See generally F.L MORTON, MORGENTALER V. BOROWSKI: ABORTION, THE CHARTER AND
THE COURTS (1992). Morgentaler, a doctor crusading for abortion rights, was found not guilty of
performing an abortion after admitting to all of the elements of the charge but arguing an affirmative
defense of necessity. Id. at 50-51, 54. The Quebec Court of Appeal overturned the jury acquittal and
substituted a conviction, based on the trial evidence. Id. at 59. However, the public outcry caused
parliament to amend the Criminal Code in 1975 so that while an acquittal can still be appealed, the
court can only order a new trial. Id. at 82. The details of the trial, appeal and change in law are de-
scribed in F.L. MORTON, MORGANTALER v. BOROWSKI: ABORTION, THE CHARTER AND THE COURTS
(1995).
246. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 676.
247. See ALAN D. GOLD, EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW: THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH, 33-36
(Irwin Law Inc. 2003); P. Brad Limpert, Beyond the Rule in Mohan: A New Model for Assessing the
Reliability of Scientific Evidence, 54 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 65 (1996); David M. Paciocco, Expert
Evidence: Where Are We Now? Where Are We Going? (June 31, 1998) (unpublished manuscript




identification, and other social science evidence). 248 Issues have been
raised about the validity and reliability of some of the expert evidence and
upon its impact on the jury.249
Roughly similar to the U.S. cases of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceutical Inc. 250 and General Electric Co. v. Joiner,251 in R. v. Mohan,252
the "first major post-Daubert Canadian precedent on expert opinion evi-
dence," the Supreme Court of Canada "clearly restated and updated" a
number of criteria for determining the "admissibility of expert evidence in
at least the spirit of Daubert."253 The court held that evidence offered by an
expert not only must logically relate to a fact in issue, but alsomust meet a
threshold of reliability beyond the qualification of the expert providing the
testimony. 254 Adopting a similar approach to Daubert, the court delineated
a four-prong test for determining the admissibility of expert evidence: re-
levance, necessity (whether the expert will provide information that is like-
ly to be outside the ordinary experience and knowledge of the trier of fact),
absence of an exclusionary rule, and a qualified expert. 255 Additionally,
when the testimony engages a novel scientific theory or technique, it
should be subject to special scrutiny. 256
Chronicling the cases that followed the Mohan decision,257 Alan
Young notes the Supreme Court's explicit reference to Daubert as a rele-
vant authority in R. v. J-L.1,258 a case in which the courts explicitly articu-
lated many of the same factors used in Daubert for assessing the
admissibility of expert evidence. 259 Mohan, as is evident in the cases that
followed, was intended to draw the judge's attention to his or her responsi-
bility to screen expert evidence allowed in court. An important goal of the
Mohan decision was to prevent juries from being influenced by unreliable
expert evidence while still permitting new and novel evidence if deemed
relevant.260 Exercising the role of "gate keeper," the court ruled that expert
248. See Paciocco, supra note 167, at 14; GOLD, supra note 247.
249. Id.
250. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
251. Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 135 (1997).
252. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 (Can.).
253. See GOLD, supra note 247, at 35, 45.
254. Mohan, 2 S.C.R. 9.
255. Id.
256. Id at 21.
257. Id.
258. R. v. J-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, para. 33 (Can.).
259. See Gold, supra note 247, at 23 ("[Tihe U.S. Supreme Court expressly adopted the scientific
method as the standard for all opinion evidence in U.S. federal courts, and this has now essentially been
echoed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. J-L.J.").
260. See Paciocco, supra note 167, at 8-15.
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opinion evidence about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
was inadmissible in R. v. Olscamp.261 In other cases, expert testimony that
failed to meet the criterion of necessity has been ruled inadmissible, for
instance, in the case of expert evidence bearing on eyewitness reliability,262
and in a sexual abuse case, on testimony bearing on the delay of a child's
disclosure of the abuse.263 However, as commentators have pointed out,
Canadian courts have been inconsistent in applying the Mohan criteria
from case to case. 264 Thus, Mohan set the stage for a control on what juries
see and hear, but systematic application of these controls is still in its deve-
lopmental stage.
In a recent decision, R. v. Abbey, the Ontario Court of Appeal over-
turned a jury acquittal on a first degree murder charge on the grounds that
the trial judge had erred in excluding expert opinion testimony from a soci-
ologist with expertise in youth gang culture that was to be proffered on
behalf of the prosecution.265 Specifically, based on his knowledge of street
gang membership and culture, the expert was to testify regarding the mean-
ing of a 'teardrop' tattoo inscribed on the face of young gang members (the
defendant also had such a tattoo), with one of the possibilities being that
the individual had killed a rival gang member. 266 Questioning the reliability
of the expert testimony, however, the trial court judge excluded the testi-
mony.267 The Crown appealed the decision.268 Broadening the scope of
expert evidence in its decision, Appellate court Justice David Doherty
opined that
Scientific validity is not a condition precedent to the admissibility of ex-
pert opinion evidence. Most expert evidence routinely heard and acted
upon in the courts cannot be scientifically validated. For example, psy-
chiatrists testify to the existence of various mental states, doctors testify
as to the cause of an injury or death ... these experts do not support their
opinions by reference to error rates, random sampling or the replication
of test results. Rather, they refer to specialized knowledge gained
261. R. v. Olscamp, [1994] 35 C.R. 4th 37, para. 34 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.).
262. R. v. McIntosh, [1997] 35 0. R.3d 97, para. 14 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
263. R. v. D.D., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, para. 70 (Can.) (A ten-year old complainant delayed two and
a half years before disclosing the abuse. The expert witness, a child psychologist was to testify that the
delay in disclosure was not indicative of truth. The court ruled that "the content of the expert evi-
dence ... was not unique or scientifically puzzling but was rather the proper subject for a simple jury
instruction.").
264. See Limpert, supra note 247, at 83; David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and
the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 123, 148 (1996).
265. R. v. Abbey, [2009] 97 O.R. 3d 330, at para. 174 (Ont. C.A.).
266. Id at para. 29.
267. Id at para. 55.
268. Id. at para. 1.
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through experience and specialized training in the relevant field. To test
the reliability of the opinion of these experts . .. using reliability factors
referable to scientific validity is to attempt to place the proverbial square
peg into the round hole.269
As the defendant has the right to now appeal the reversal of his acquit-
tal, the Supreme Court may soon step in to further delineate the proper
scope of expert opinion evidence.
Questions are also being raised about evidence derived from the natu-
ral sciences. These issues came to a head with a series of tragic wrongful
convictions in which the most compelling piece of evidence supporting the
prosecution's case involved seriously flawed testimony of a Dr. Charles
Smith, a now discredited Ontario Pathologist. 270 Throughout the late 80s
and 90s, Dr. Smith was viewed as one of Canada's leading experts in pe-
diatric forensic pathology and the leading expert in Ontario.2711n 2005,
however, the Chief Coroner of Ontario called for a full review of Dr.
Smith's work in "criminally suspicious cases and homicides in the
1990s."272 The results of the review found that in "20 of the 45 cases, the
reviewers took issue with Dr. Smith's opinion in either his report or his
testimony, or both" (12 of these cases had resulted in verdicts of guilt).273
This uncovered a string of wrongful convictions 274 and culminated in the
Goudge Inquiry, conducted by Justice Stephan Goudge of the Ontario
Court of Appeal.275 Its mandate involved two tasks: (1) to determine "what
went so badly wrong," and (2) to provide recommendations "to restore and
269. Id. at para. 109.
270. See STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO: REPORT, VOL.
1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (Toronto: Ontario Minister of the Attorney General, 2008), available at
http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/report/index.html.
271. Id. at 6.
272. Id. at 7.
273. Id.
274. Among these was the case of Williams Mullins-Johnson, an Ontario man who spent twelve
years in prison for the rape and murder of his four year old niece, whose death was later attributed to
natural causes. STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO: REPORT,
VOL. 2: SYsTEMIC REVIEW 27, 30-32 (Toronto: Ontario Minister of the Attorney General, 2008). In
overturning Mullins-Johnson's conviction, the Court of Appeal found there was no evidence he was
guilty of any crime. Id. at 120. Mullins-Johnson was awarded $4.25 million in compensation. The
Canadian Press, Mullins-Johnson awarded $4.25M for wrongful conviction, CTV TORONTO (Oct. 21,
2010), available at http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20101021/wrongful-conviction-
compensation- 101021/2010102 1/?hub=TorontoNewHome (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). He is but one of
several people who were wrongly accused of killing children based on the flawed evidence from Dr.
Charles Smith. See GOUDGE, supra note 270, at 5-7.
275. See GOUDGE, supra note 270, at 3-8; Hon. Justice Stephen T. Goudge-Biography, INQUIRY
INTO PEDIATRIC FORENsIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO,
http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/commissioner/index.html (last visited Feb.
18,2011). L
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enhance public confidence in pediatric forensic pathology" that will ensure
such miscarriages of justice never happen again. 276 In October 2008, the
over 1000 page report was released, with sweeping recommendations
made, and legislation passed to create more checks and balances in death
investigations. 277
IX. ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JURY SYSTEM.
The Inuit, or Eskimo people, as they were then known, were first in-
troduced to the Canadian jury system in 1917 in what Edwin Keedy, who
was present at the proceedings, aptly labeled a "remarkable murder tri-
al." 278 Two priests working among the Inuit people, who were still largely
isolated from Western culture, went missing.279 After a long hunt through-
out the region, a party of the Northwest Mounted Police (later the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police) uncovered the fact that two Inuit men, Sinisiak
and Uluksak, had killed the priests near the Coppermine River.280The two
Inuit admitted the acts, and they were transported two thousand miles south
to Edmonton, Alberta, along with two interpreters and an elderly Inuit who
was to be a witness.281
Sinisiak was appointed legal counsel, and the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court of Alberta conducted his trial for murder of one of the
priests. 282 Although the trial took place in summer, in the first stage the two
Inuit men were dressed in their native dress, with a tub full of water and ice
provided to soak their feet and help them stay cool. 283 Through translators
the men admitted the act of which they were accused, but gave detailed
testimony indicating that the priests had abused them and, moreover,
created in their minds a belief that the priests were possessed by spirits and
were planning to kill them.284 In fact, the Inuit subsequently ate pieces of
the priests' liver as a protection against their evil spirits. 285
276. Id. at 6.
277. See GOUDGE, supra note 270; GOUDGE, supra note 274. This resulted in a forensic pathology
service, an oversight council and complaints committee, and improvements for training of forensic
pathologists.
278. Edwin R. Keedy, A Remarkable Murder Trial: Rex v. Sinnisiak, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 48, 48
(1951).
279. Id at 48-49.
280. Id at 49.
281. Id. at 50.
282. Id at 51.
283. Id at 51-52.
284. Id at 59-61.
285. Id. at 61.
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At the close of the trial, the prosecution contended that the accused
killed the priests for their rifles. 286 Defense counsel argued that the Inuit
should be judged by the standards of their own culture.287 The judge in-
structed the jury that a cultural defense must be rejected.288 He also told the
jury that if Sinisiak was found guilty of murder, he would have no choice,
under Canadian law, but to sentence him to death.289 However, the judge
also stated that he would recommend clemency, which he was confident
would be granted.290 After an hour of deliberation, the jury returned a ver-
dict of not guilty. 291
The story did not end in Edmonton. Within six days the accused were
moved two hundred miles south to Calgary, and both Inuit were tried for
the death of the second priest.292 After forty-five minutes of deliberation,
the jury returned a verdict of guilty but with the strongest recommendation
of mercy. 293 Both men were sentenced to death by hanging, as required by
law, but the Inuit were told that the sentence was deferred until the "Big
Chief far away" could review it.294 On August 19, 1916, the death sentence
was commuted to life in prison, and they were returned to the Arctic under
custody of the Mounted Police and held first at Herschel Island and then at
Great Slave Lake. 295 In 1919, the two were released from custody and re-
turned to their people.296 However, the order of release contained the re-
quirement that they make known to others that:
Eskimos live and are governed under a system of law.. . with equality
as against both white man, Indian and Eskimo[.] ... [W]hile ... these
prisoners have been visited by a dispensation of mercy whereby their
lives have been spared ... these reasons are not likely to [prevail] on
another occasion, either for them or for any other Eskimo, seeing that the
proceedings in the present case have served to inform them of their re-
sponsibilities, and that they are solemnly charged with their duty to serve
God and honour the King and carefully to observe his laws. 297
286. Id. at 62.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 63.
289. Id at 64.
290. Id
291. Id.
292. Id. at 64-65.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 66.
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Rex v. Sinisiak served as a seminal event in attempts to establish the
rule of law through jury trial for aboriginal peoples living in Canada's arc-
tic region, but a trial involving a roughly similar scenario was played out
again as late as 1966 in the case of R. v. Aiyaoot.298 In an isolated hunting
camp a small band of Inuit became stranded due to unusual weather condi-
tions.299 Both shelter and food were scarce when Soosee, an unusually
large and strong Inuit woman and the mother of Aiyaoot, began acting
strangely, reported hearing spirits and attempted to kill her sleeping hus-
band with a rock.300 The rest of the hunting party, frightened by her beha-
vior, retreated to a small island where they could still observe her and the
camp. 301 Soosee began to destroy the tents and remaining supplies. 302
Frightened by her behavior and the threat she posed to survival, the group
concluded that she was possessed by evil spirits. 303 After talking the situa-
tion over, the others sent her son and a nephew, Shooyook, back to the
camp with loaded rifles in an attempt to placate her, but with a consensus
view that if the attempt failed she should be killed.304 When Soosee began
to attack the two men, she was shot and killed. 305 The others returned to the
camp and buried her according to traditional Inuit custom, placing the body
on the hard permafrost and piling stones around and over the body.306
Several months later when a Royal Canadian Mounted Police plane
landed near the camp to check on the health of the Inuit, the community
reported what they had done. 307 Because the killing was in violation of
Canadian law, a murder trial was arranged in Spence Bay, two hundred
miles to the south.308 In contrast to the Sinisiak trial, an attempt was made
to include Inuit on the jury because of the apparent clash of cultures.309 The
trouble was that the Inuit at Spence Bay who were also fluent in English
298. JACK SISSONS, JUDGE OF THE FAR NORTH: THE MEMOIRS OF JACK SISSONS, 181-86 (1986);
W.G. MORROW, NORTHERN JUSTICE: THE MEMOIRS OF MR. JUSTICE WILLIAM G. MORROW 65-72
(W.H. Morrow, ed. 1995) [hereinafter Morrow, Northern Justice]; W.G. Morrow, A Survey of Jury
Verdicts in the Northwest Territories, 8 ALTA L. REv. 50, 51-52 (1970) [hereinafter Morrow, Jury
Verdicts].
299. Morrow, Northern Justice, supra note 298, at 65.
300. Id at 66.
301. Sissons, supra note 298, at 184.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 185.
304. Id. at 184-185.
305. Id. at 185.
306. Morrow, Northern Justice, supra note 298, at 66.
307. Id. at 66-67.
308. See Sissons, supra note 298, at 183.
309. See id at 182-183.
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had been recruited as interpreters for the trial. 310 Consequently, a plane was
sent to recruit potential jurors from communities in the sparsely settled
area; and after logging fifteen hundred miles, the plane returned with two
Inuit who served on the six-person jury, which also included the first wom-
an juror in the arctic region.311 The trial was marked by an understanding
of the harsh circumstances faced by Aiyaoot and the other members of the
hunting camp as well as Inuit cultural beliefs. 312 The jury acquitted Aiyaoot
but found Shooyook guilty of manslaughter. 313 The judge sentenced
Shooyook to two years in prison but suspended the sentence, and Shooyook
was reunited with his wife and children that evening. 314
Sinisiak and Aiyaoot help to illustrate attempts to provide and legiti-
mate law among the Inuit and Indian tribal peoples living in isolated areas
and holding cultural perspectives that were, and to a lesser degree still are,
different than the rest of Canada.
In 1999, the Northwest Territories, encompassing an area of 1.3 mil-
lion square miles and ranging over four time zones was divided into The
Northwest Territories, with a population of approximately 44,000 persons
and Nunavut with a population of approximately 34,000 persons; roughly
eighty-five percent of Nunavut's population is composed of Inuit.315 Ap-
proximately fifty-five percent of the Northwest Territories are composed of
aboriginal peoples representing five different Indian, or Dene, tribes (Cree,
Chipewayen, Dogrib, Slavely and Gwich'in), two Inuit subgroups (Inuit
and Inuvialuit) and persons who identify themselves as Metis (persons of
mixed Indian and European heritage).3161n the Northwest Territories today
Canadian law recognizes, in addition to English and French, seven different
Dene languages and two dialects of the Inuit language.317 Many of the
communities are small, consisting of 500 persons or less. 318
In the first half of the twentieth century, the problems of isolation and
sparse population groupings resulted in few jury trials. Rather, cases tended
310. Id. at 182.
311. Morrow, Northern Justice, supra note 298, at 68; Sissons, supra note 298, at 183.
312. See Sissons, supra note 298, at 181-182; Morrow, Jury Verdicts, supra note 298, at 51.
313. Morrow, Northern Justice, supra note 298, at 70; Sissons, supra note 298, at 186.
314. Id.
315. See NUNAVUT BUREAU OF STATISTICS, Census Data,
http://www.eia.gov.nu.ca/stats/census.html (follow hyperlink "Nunavut Census population by region,
community and Inuit identity, 1996, 2001, 2006 (4 tables)") (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
316. See STATISTICS CANADA, Population by Selected Ethnic Origins, by Province and Territory
(2006 Census) (Northwest Territories), http://www4O.statcan.gc.call01/cstOl/demo26m-eng.htm (last
modified July 28, 2009).
317. J. Vertes, 17 COMMONWEALTH JUDICIAL JOURNAL 14 (2007).
318. Id.
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to be tried by a judge or magistrate. However, with the establishment of the
Territorial Court of the Northwest Territories in 1955, accused persons
have increasingly exercised the right to jury trial. 319 In the first fourteen
years of the Court, there was an average of five trials per year.320 The
Criminal Code provided for six-person juries in the Northwest Territories
because of the sparseness of population, and until 1965, women were pro-
hibited from serving.321 Additionally, an eligibility requirement for jury
service was the ability to speak and understand English. 322 In consequence,
between 1955 and 1968, despite the fact that aboriginal peoples were the
accused in fifty-five percent of the cases, aboriginals served on only twen-
ty-seven of the sixty-eight jury trials typically as only one of the six-
member jury.323
In 1965, women were declared eligible to serve on juries, and in 1985
the six-person jury was declared unconstitutional. 324 In 1988, The Legisla-
tive Assembly of the Northwest Territories amended the Jury Act to pro-
vide that an aboriginal unilingual person could serve as a juror.325 Between
1987 and 1991, an average of forty-seven jury trials took place per year.326
In 1998, the last year before the Northwest Territory was divided, there
were eighty-three trials and sixty-five were in communities outside Yel-
lowknife, the largest city.327
Christopher Gora conducted formal interviews with judges, lawyers,
and other persons connected to the court process that revealed a number of
problems with the implementation of jury trials.328 While every effort is
made to keep the trial in the community in which the offense occurred,
major problems have arisen in this regard.329 Sometimes the community is
too small to obtain a jury, particularly when many of its members are re-
lated to the victim or the accused. 330 Linguistic problems continue to be a
319. See Morrow, Jury Verdicts, supra note 298, at 50, 54-58.
320. See id. at 54-58; see also Sissons, supra note 298 at 181-86 (discussing the legal system in the
Northwest Territories).
321. See Sissons, supra note 298 at 182; Morrow, Jury Verdicts, supra note 298, at 50.
322. See Sissons, supra note 298 at 182.
323. See Morrow, Jury Verdicts, supra note 298, at 50, 54-58. There were two all-native juries. Id.
at 50.
324. See R. v. Punch, [1985] 22 C.C.C. 3d 289, para. 58-84 (N.W.T.S.C.).
325. See Christopher Gora, Jury Trials in the Small Communities of the Northwest Territories, 13
WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 156, 162 (1993).
326. See id. at 157.
327. Vertes, supra note 317.
328. Gora, supra note 325, at 170-174.
329. Id at 171-72.
330. Id.
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source of difficulty because of the lack of trained interpreters. 331 In addi-
tion, local political struggles between families and ruling cliques can pre-
vent the formation of a jury in that location. 332 Thus, a change of venue is
required, bringing additional problems regarding preparation of the case
and accessibility of witnesses. Many of Gora's respondents also noted a
substantial trend toward acquittals, especially in comparison to trials before
a judge alone.333 Additionally, there appears to be a greater reluctance to
serve on juries than elsewhere in Canada.334 Both the acquittal rates and the
reluctance to serve may reflect unwillingness to pass judgment on one's
neighbor. However, it also appears to reflect a preference for community
values and traditional cultural ways of handling deviance that are in con-
flict with the legal values and processes of the broader Canadian society.
Gora discussed a number of potential reforms that might ease the dif-
ficulties of jury trial in the Canadian North. 335 These include simplifying
the charge to make the language more accessible to the jurors and altering
the configuration of the court to make it more similar to traditional com-
munity forums, allowing the community to select the jury pool, and allow-
ing community input into sentencing. 336
Justice John Vertes has described the development of legal interpreta-
tion training programs to assist the court when the accused is a unilingual
aboriginal person. 337 Also, interpreters have been allowed in the jury room
to assist unilingual jurors, and attempts have been made to have lawyers
and judges convert legal terminology into plain language so that aboriginal
interpreters can explain the concepts to the jurors as well as the accused.
Justice Vertes has also drawn attention to the fact that nowhere else in the
Western world have such broad allowances been made for jurors who do
not speak one of the majority languages. 338
331. Id. at 173.
332. Id. at 172.
333. Id. at 172. This problem was also raised during informal interviews that author Vidmar under-
took in Baker Lake, an Inuit community of about 1,400 persons, in the summer of 1997.
334. Id. at 173.
335. See Gora, supra note 328 at 174-80.
336. Id. Having no formal courthouse, trials in smaller communities take place in hotels, communi-
ty centers, or schools. The temporary spatial designs, however, are made similar to more traditional
court settings.
337. Vertes, supra note 317.
338. Id. Justice Vertes also drew attention to the fact that other forms of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, such as sentencing circles, sentencing dispositions with restorative justice aims and local Justices
of the Peace. Id. at 21.
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CONCLUSION
The Canadian jury system exhibits conservative elements of an earlier
age regarding judicial control over the trial process. On the other hand,
there are trends in its continuing evolution that attempt to take into account
the influence of modem mass media on the fairness of trial, and potential
racism resulting from changes in Canada's demographic profile. The rec-
ognition that the presumption of impartiality may not always hold even
when reinforced with strong judicial instructions involves an implicit rec-
ognition of twentieth century psychological understanding of human beha-
vior. Concern about the legitimacy of the jury system in the eyes of
minority groups has resulted and the small steps that have been taken to
increase the actual and perceived fairness are other indications of these
progressive trends. Over the past several decades, accommodations of Can-
ada's jury law to cultural and linguistic issues associated with Canada's
aboriginal peoples puts Canada in the forefront of countries attempting to
deal with injustices of the past.
This is not to say that the system is ideal. The balancing between
competing values and policies has required compromises of substance and
process. Nevertheless, as a whole, the criminal jury remains a robust insti-
tution in the scheme of Canadian life and law.
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